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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON SCOTT TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CHARLEEN TAYLOR, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 930381-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended as this 
is an appeal from a final order and decree of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County regarding a divorce action. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred in 
awarding Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's retirement account 
commencing with the date of the parties marriage and terminating on 
the date the Decree of Divorce was signed and entered by the Court, 
when the Court specifically found that the Plaintiff and Defendant, 
other than social contact, have had no contact since they ceased 
working as a marital unit and separated in 1984? 
2. Was it an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to award 
a judgment to Defendant against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
$4,500.00 for attorney's fees and cost when the Defendant failed to 
show her financial need, and the ability of the Plaintiff to pay 
the requested fees, and when there was no determination by the 
court as to the reasonableness of the fees proffered by Defendant's 
counsel. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1993) 
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or 
6, and in any action to establish an order of 
custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court 
may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, 
and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of 
the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may 
include provision for costs of the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 17, 1980 (Tr. , p. 
3). At the time of their marriage Plaintiff was 43 years old and 
Defendant was 49 years old. There were no children born as issue 
of this marriage (Tr., p. 3). 
At the time of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was employed 
as a U.S. Postal Service mailhandler and was continuously employed 
there during the marriage (Tr., p. 15) . Although the Defendant was 
employed as a secretary at the time of the parties' marriage, she 
decided to quit her job in 1983 and remain at home as a housewife 
(Tr., pp. 5-6, 104-105). 
The parties separated in 1984 and have had no contact, other 
than social contact, since their separation (R., p. 133). 
Following the parties' separation Plaintiff paid Defendant Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month until August, 1986. In 1990, 
the Plaintiff was ordered under a temporary order to pay Four 
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Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month to the Defendant as spousal 
support (R., p. 134). 
During the course of the Trial, testimony was offered by each 
party regarding the date on which the parties ceased working as a 
marital unit and separated. The testimony of both parties 
indicated that the separation occurred in 1984 (Tr., pp. 3, 106). 
Based on this testimony Plaintiff argued that Defendant was 
entitled to one-half of the U.S. Postal retirement account the 
Plaintiff had accumulated during the time in which the parties were 
together and working as a marital unit, thus the appropriate date 
on which the Plaintiff's retirement account should be valued and 
then divided is the date of the parties' separation in 1984. 
Defendant argued that the appropriate date on which the retirement 
account should be valued and then divided is the date the marriage 
is terminated, in the present case that would be approximately 
eight and one-half years from the date of the separation of the 
parties. 
The Court found the following properties to be pre-marital and 
the separate property of the Plaintiff: the Riverton property, the 
Dean Whitter utility account, the Cottonwood Canyon Lots 206 and 
207, and the Potter Lane Property (R. , p. 138). The Court found 
the following property was pre-marital and the separate property of 
the Defendant: a personal residence located at 2128 Kayland Way, 
Salt Lake City (R., p. 138). 
The Court granted the Plaintiff a divorce from the Defendant 
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on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The Court found the 
following was martial property of the parties and should be divided 
equally: the Dean Whitter money market account, the First Investor 
IRA Account, IDS Account, all of which were accumulated from the 
Plaintiff's postal income, and the Montana property (R., p. 137). 
Despite the eight and one-half year separation, the Court 
ruled the Plaintiff's retirement account with the U.S. Postal 
Service should be valued and then divided commencing with the date 
of the parties' marriage and terminating on the date the Decree of 
Divorce is signed (R., p. 141). 
The Plaintiff was also ordered to pay alimony in the amount of 
Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Dollars ($225.00) for a period of four 
(4) years after the divorce is entered (R., p. 141). 
In addition, the Plaintiff was ordered to pay Defendant's 
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of Four Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00), despite the fact there was no 
assertion at trial as to the Defendant's financial need for 
attorney fees, nor as to the ability of the Plaintiff to pay the 
Defendant's attorney fees, nor was there a determination by the 
court as to the reasonableness of the fees proffered by Defendant's 
counsel. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In determining alimony and property distribution in divorce 
cases, the trial courts have considerable discretion which will be 
upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion 
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is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
App. 1988) . It is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the 
trial court's decision to marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of evidence and, therefore erroneous. Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989). 
Findings of fact in divorce appeals, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if 
it is against the great weight of evidence. Bountiful v. Riley, 
784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). The Trial Court's findings must 
be supported by the evidence presented at the trial. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 836 P. 2d 814 (Utah App. 1992) ; Cumminqs v. Cummincrs, 821 
P.2d 421, 474-75 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 
421, 423 (Utah App. 1990); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73,77 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
On appeal the standard of review for conclusions of law is 
correctness and the trial court's conclusions are given no special 
deference. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). 
Marital property's value is determined as of the time of the 
divorce decree or trial. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218, 
1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also Berqer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1985). The reason this rule was established is because "by 
the very nature of a property division, the marital estate is 
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evaluated according to what property exists as the time the 
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah 1980) . However, Courts can in the exercise of their 
equitable powers, use a different date, if one party has "acted 
obstructively, . . . " Peck v. Peck, 738 P. 2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 
1987). 
With regards to an award of attorney fees and costs, the same 
standard of review is applicable and the decision to award attorney 
fees is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1993); Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 
1305, 1309 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
App. 1991). The Trial Court, in using its sound discretion must 
take the following three factors into consideration: (1) the 
financial need of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the 
other spouse to pay; and (3) the reasonableness of the requested 
fees. Bell, 810 P.2d at 493; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 
1337 (Utah App. 1988) . Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have reversed attorney fee awards where a party has failed to show 
one of the three required factors. See e.g., Newmever v. Newmeyer, 
745 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Utah 1987); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 
426 (Utah App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App. 
1990). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in awarding 
Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's U.S. Postal Service 
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Retirement Account commencing with the date of the parties1 
marriage and terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce was 
signed, which was May 4, 1993, when the court specifically found 
that the Plaintiff and Defendant, other than social contact, have 
had no contact since they ceased working as a marital unit and 
separated in 1984. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred in awarding 
a judgment to Defendant against the Plaintiff in the amount of Four 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) for attorney's fees and 
cost, when the Defendant failed to show her financial need for 
attorney's fees, and the ability of the Plaintiff to pay the 
requested fees, and no determination was made by the court as to 
the reasonableness of the fees proffered by Defendant's counsel. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR ERRED IN 
AWARDING DEFENDANT ONE-HALF OF THE PLAINTIFF'S RETIREMENT 
ACCOUNT COMMENCING WITH THE DATE OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE 
AND TERMINATING ON THE DATE THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
WAS SIGNED, WHEN THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, OTHER THAN SOCIAL CONTACT, HAVE 
HAD NO CONTACT SINCE THEY CEASED WORKING AS A MARITAL 
UNIT AND SEPARATED IN 1984. 
In this case, it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to determine that the Defendant was entitled to 
share one-half of the Plaintiff's U.S. Postal Service Retirement 
Account commencing with the date of the parties' marriage and 
terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce was signed, 
which was May 4, 1993, when the Court specifically found that the 
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Plaintiff and Defendant, other than social contact, have had no 
contact since they ceased working as a marital unit and separated 
in 1984. 
A. Time Used to Value and Divide Marital Property 
Generally the marital estate is valued at the time of trial, 
Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah 1985). But, this is 
not an intractable rule. See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 
(Utah App. 1990); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 
1987). "However, the trial court's findings must be sufficiently 
detailed to explain its basis for deviating from the general rule." 
Morgan, at 688. A court may properly consider such things as the 
length of the marriage and parties respective contributions to the 
marriage, in making a property division. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 
610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
In the case of Peck v. Peck, the Court of Appeals noted that 
in view of the evidence adduced at trial, that Plaintiff was unable 
to show the current value of the parties1 business because the 
Defendant failed to keep records, and that evidence was shown as to 
Defendant's mismanagement and large expenditures of corporate 
funds, that the trial court might therefore value the business as 
of the time the parties separated rather than the date of divorce 
decree. 
In the case of Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 
1991), the trial court used the above standard in determining 
whether the "standard of living" should be determined for the 
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purpose of calculating alimony from the date of separation or the 
date of the trial. In Howell, the parties were married in 1956, 
had five children during their marriage, and separated in 1986. 
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November of 1987, the trial occurred 
in December 1988. During the marriage the Defendant was a 
homemaker and had held only part time and unskilled labor jobs; 
Plaintiff worked with an airline. Between the time of the 
separation and the trial the Plaintiff's income doubled as a result 
of a successful takeover by another airline. In light of the facts 
of this case, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's ability to 
take advantage of the change in salary was at least in part a 
result of having persevered during the lean times, as did his wife 
and children. 
Thus in this case trial court erred in looking at the pre-
separation standard of living in setting alimony, but the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that trial courts have discretion to determine 
the standard of living based on all relevant facts and equitable 
principles. 
In the present case Plaintiff argues the standard used in the 
Howell case also applies to his case. That the trial court has 
discretion to determine the date on which property, in this case, 
Plaintiff's retirement account, should be valued and divided 
between the parties. In the present case, the parties were married 
only four and one-half years prior to their separation, during the 
time of separation in 1984 and the trial in 1992 the Defendant made 
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no contribution to the Plaintiff's retirement account, from the 
time of separation the parties pursued their own interests and 
lives. Thus, in light of the facts in the present case it was an 
abuse of discretion and/ or err for the court to award the 
Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's retirement account commencing 
with the date of the parties marriage and terminating on the date 
the Decree of Divorce was signed, rather than on the date the 
parties separated and began to pursue their individual lives. 
In the case of Hoacrland v. Hoaqland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep 25, 26 
(Utah App. May 7, 1993), the trial court found that the marriage 
essentially ended when the husband moved out of Utah, despite that 
fact that the wife did not file for divorce until over two and one-
half years later. The Court of Appeals held that because the trial 
court made relevant findings, supported by relevant evidence and 
equitable principles, it did not abuse its discretion in departing 
from the general rule and basing alimony on the standard of living 
enjoyed at the time of separation. 
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion 
and/or erred in awarding Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's 
retirement account from the date of the parties' marriage and 
terminating on the date the Decree of Divorce was signed when the 
trial court specifically found that other than social contact the 
parties had no contact from the date of separation in 1984, and as 
in the Hoaqland case the marriage essentially ended when the 
Plaintiff moved out. 
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B. Fair and Equitable Distribution 
Equitable distribution is the apportionment of the marital 
assets or property between divorcing parties in a just and 
equitable manner, regardless of the title ownership• Equitable 
division of property upon divorce is responsive to the concept that 
marriage is a shared enterprise, a mutual undertaking, and in many 
ways is similar to a partnership. Thus, equitable distribution is 
awarded to recognize contributions that each spouse had made toward 
the accumulation of property during the time span of the viable 
marital relationship. 24 Am Jur 2d Equitable Distribution § 870. 
The court seeks, by giving both spouses an interest in 
"martial property" upon dissolution of marriage, to award economic 
credit in the distribution of property for indirect or domestic 
contributions to the accumulation of property during the marital 
relationship. Thus, equitable distribution can be used to give 
recognition to the essential supportive role played by the spouse 
in the home, acknowledging that as a homemaker, partner, and parent 
that one should clearly be entitled to a share of the family assets 
accumulated during the marriage. By recognizing and compensating 
the homemaker as an equal partner to the marriage, the partner 
whose domestic contributions have assisted in giving economic value 
to the tangible assets of the marriage. Id. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has found that the main purpose of 
property division in divorce cases is to achieve a fair, just, and 
equitable result between the parties. See Fletcher v. Fletcherr 
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615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). Specifically, the goal is to 
allocate property in a manner which "best serves the needs of the 
parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
In the present case, the Defendant established by her own 
testimony that once she and the Plaintiff separated that they no 
longer discussed their lives together, their children from previous 
relationships, their financial concerns nor did they have sexual 
relations (Tr., p. 133). Once the parties separated in 1984 the 
Plaintiff and Defendant no longer worked as a marital unit and 
Defendant made no contribution to the Plaintiff's retirement 
account, or life for that matter, either directly nor indirectly. 
Despite parties' separation Plaintiff voluntarily paid Defendant 
the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month until August, 
1986 (R., p. 134) . Later the Plaintiff was under a temporary order 
requiring him to pay the Defendant the sum of Four Hundred Dollars 
($400.00) per month as spousal support. 
Based on the record, Plaintiff and Defendant ceased working as 
a marital unit in 1984, approximately four and one-half years after 
the parties married, thus, it was inequitable and an abuse of 
discretion for the Trial Court to grant the Defendant one-half of 
the Plaintiff's retirement account from the date of the parties' 
marriage to the signing of the Decree of Divorce, when the Trial 
Court specifically noted that other than social contact, the 
parties have had no contact, and ceased working as a marital unit 
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since their separation in 1984. 
To permit the Defendant to have one-half of the Plaintiff's 
retirement account from the time of the parties separation to the 
time of the signing of the divorce decree, eight and one-half years 
later, would be a form of unjust enrichment on the part of the 
Defendant. Based on the trial court's findings, she will passively 
received the benefit of Plaintiff's retirement account which it is 
unconscionable for her to retain, considering she made no 
contribution whatsoever for the property she received during the 
eight and one-half years the parties were separation prior to their 
divorce. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING 
PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS WHEN 
THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING 
HER FINANCIAL NEED, AND PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO PAY THE 
REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES 
PROFFERED. 
A. Attorney Fees 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to 
pay Defendant's attorney fees and costs in light of the failure of 
the Defendant to show evidence at trial that the Defendant is in 
need of financial assistance, and Plaintiff's ability to pay the 
fees requested. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993) empowers a court to use its 
sound discretion to order a party to pay to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
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party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. 
The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
In order to award attorney's fees, the court must base its 
decision upon evidence of the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 841 
(Utah App. 1992); see also Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
App. 1991); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 
1988) . In determining the reasonableness of the attorney fees the 
court shall consider the necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates 
commonly charged for divorce actions in the community. Newmeyer v. 
Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987). 
In Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 741-42 (Utah App. 1992), the 
wife claimed that the court abused its discretion in awarding only 
$3,000 in attorney fees when the amount proffered was much greater. 
The Court of Appeals found that other than its previous finding 
relating to an increase in the wife's income, the court failed to 
find whether the wife needed financial assistance. In addition, 
the Court found that while the trial court made general findings 
regarding the husband's income, it made no findings regarding the 
husband's ability to pay wife's attorney fees, nor did the trial 
court make findings regarding the reasonableness of the fees 
proffered by the wife's attorney. 
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Another case that addresses this issue is Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). In that case both 
parties appealed the trial court's award of partial reimbursement 
of attorney fees to Mrs. Chambers. The Court found that, "since 
the trial court, in awarding attorney fees, did not address the 
reasonableness of the fees, and stopped short of finding that each 
party would have the means to pay their own fees out of "the money 
being distributed to both," such award of attorney fees constituted 
an abuse of discretion." 
In the present case, the Defendant failed to show the 
Defendant's financial need for attorney fees. The only manner in 
which Defendant addressed this issue at trial was as follows: 
Defendant's Counsel asked Defendant, "Now, are you asking for some 
contribution from Mr. Taylor to help you with the attorney's fees?" 
Defendant responds, "Yes." (Tr., p. 159). In addition, the 
Defendant failed to show the Plaintiff's ability to pay the 
requested fees. 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in 
awarding the Defendant attorney fees and costs in the sum of Four 
Thousand Five Hundred ($4,500.00) for several reasons. First, 
because other than its previous finding relating to the 
determination of alimony, the court failed to find whether the 
Defendant needed financial assistance. Second, while the trial 
court made general findings regarding Plaintiff's income, it made 
no findings regarding Plaintiff's ability to pay Defendant attorney 
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fees. Finally, the trial court failed to make findings regarding 
the reasonableness of the fees the Defendant's attorney proffered. 
B. Costs 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), the » 
Court of Appeals held that Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3 empowers a court 
to use its sound discretion to define costs as those reasonable 
amounts that are reasonably expended to prosecute or defend a 
divorce action based on need and ability to pay. 
In the present case, as previously noted in the Muir case, the 
Defendant failed to offer evidence as to her financial need for 
assistance to pay for costs incurred in litigating this matter, nor 
did the Defendant establish the Plaintiff's ability to pay the 
requested costs. 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in 
granting the Defendant's costs without making findings as to the 
Defendant's financial need for assistance in paying for costs 
incurred in this matter and without determining the Plaintiff's 
ability to pay the requested costs, and without making findings 
regarding the reasonableness of the costs the Defendant's attorney 
proffered. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the trial court's abuse of discretion and/ or 
err in awarding Defendant one-half of the Plaintiff's U.S. Postal 
Service Retirement Account commencing with the date of the parties' 
marriage and terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce was 
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signed, the Defendant has been unjustly enriched. The Court, using 
its equitable powers, should order that the Defendant is only 
entitled to one-half of the Plaintiff's retirement account 
commencing with the date of the parties1 marriage and terminating 
on the date the parties' separated and ceased working together as 
a martial unit. 
The trial court's determination regarding attorney fees and 
costs is not supported by the record. Thus, the Court should not 
have awarded attorney fees and costs to the Defendant. 
DATED this day of _ J[jj0LUZt 1993. 
0 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
7434 SOUTH STATE, #102 
MIDVALE UT 84047 
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ITEM 2 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
MAY 0 4 1SS3 
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN (3300) 
Attorney for Defendant 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON SCOTT TAYLOR, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CHARLEEN TAYLOR, : Case No. 904904902 DA 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the 
above-entitled Court, on the 2nd day of November, 1992, before the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting 
without jury. The Plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorney, 
David Paul White. The Defendant appeared in person and by her 
attorney, Steven C. Tycksen. The Court received evidence on behalf 
of each of the parties, and after being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes and enters its, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide and actual 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for at 
least three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
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2. That Plaintiff and Defendant are married having been legally 
wed at Salt Lake City, State of Utah on July 17, 1980. 
3. That more than 90 days has expired since the commencement of 
this action. 
4. That grounds for divorce exist pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-1, in that there are irreconcilable 
differences in the marriage, such that the marriage cannot continue. 
5. That there are no minor children born as issue of this 
marriage and none are expected. 
6. The Court finds that at the time of the parties marriage 
they were possessed of the following pre-marital properties: 
For the Plaintiff: 
a. A duplex located on 453 "E" Street in Salt Lake City 
b. A fourplex located on 655 South 10th West in Salt Lake 
City 
c. A personal residence on Wren Road 
d. Two cabin lots in Big Cottonwood Canyon 
For the Defendant: 
a. A personal residence located at 2128 Kayland Way, Salt 
Lake City 
b. A savings account of approximately $30,000. 
7. At the time of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was employed 
as a U.S. Postal Service mailhandler and has been continuously there 
employed during the marriage and is currently earning $3,150 gross 
orsno 
per month, with a net after tax income of approximately $2,000. 
8. The mortgage on Defendant's home was fully paid off at the 
time of her marriage to Plaintiff. Further there were no other liens 
of any kind on said home. There was no other evidence of any 
significant debts for which Defendant would have been liable at the 
time of her marriage to Plaintiff. 
9. During the marriage Defendant quit her employ in 1983 and 
remained at home to take care of Plaintiff's and her own children who 
were both living in their marital home. 
10. Defendant is now 61 years of age and has only recently 
received her first full time job since 1983. She has recently 
secured a position of employment as a receptionist for Intermountain 
Health Care, earning $1,150 per month gross and $890 net after taxes. 
11. Plaintiff's reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses 
are $1,650. Defendant's reasonable and necessary living expenses are 
$1,250. Plaintiff has a net income surplus after his expenses of 
$350. Defendant has a need for additional income to meet her monthly 
expenses in the amount of $350. 
12. The parties have had no contact since their separation in 
1984 other than social contact. 
13. During the marriage the parties entered into an installment 
contract to purchase some property in Montana. The property was held 
jointly at first. The parties later granted an undivided one-half 
interest to the family trusts of both Plaintiff and Defendant. 
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Following the parties7 separation the property suffered a decline in 
value and Plaintiff made a deal to trade title to part of the 
property for title free and clear to the remainder. This remaining 
property was then sold on an installment contract and the proceeds 
have been divided equally between the parties ever since. 
14. Following the parties' separation Plaintiff paid Defendant 
$500.00 per month until August, 1986. He was ordered under a 
temporary order to pay $400.00 per month to Defendant as spousal 
support. 
15. The Montana property was purchased during the parties7 
marriage. 
a. At the time of the parties7 separation in about 1984, 
Defendant began making payments on the Montana property in the amount 
of Three Hundred and Forty-One Dollars ($341.00) per month. 
b. During the time that Defendant made payments on the 
Montana property Plaintiff paid to Defendant the sum of Five Hundred 
Dollars ($500.00) per month. At times the payment made by Defendant 
on the Montana property was taken from this Five Hundred Dollar 
($500.00) amount with the balance being used for living expenses and 
at other times the payment was taken from Defendant's savings. The 
Court cannot determine from the evidence how much was taken from 
Defendant's savings for payment on the Montana property and how much 
was used from the Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month she 
received from Plaintiff. 
4 
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c. There was no agreement between the parties that any oi 
the Five Hundred Dollar ($500.00) amount would be used for payment c 
the Montana property. The Defendant made payments on the Montana 
property because in her view Plaintiff was not going to do so. 
d. At the same time that Plaintiff stopped making payments 
to Defendant he then began making the payment himself on the Montana 
property for a period of approximately six (6) months at which time 
the property was sold. 
e. Defendant entered the marriage with Thirty Thousand 
Dollars ($30,000.00) in savings and at the time of the divorce had 
approximately Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) to Seven Hundred Dollars 
($700.00) remaining. 
f. Of the Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) was used for a portion of the down 
payment on the Montana property. The Plaintiff paid the balance of 
the down payment in the amount of approximately Thirty-Nine Thousand 
Dollars ($39,000.00). 
g. There is no evidence that Defendant used any portion of 
her Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) for the payment of marital 
debts other than the Montana property as has already been described 
by the Court. Said Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) was also 
used in part for living expenses both before and after the separation 
of the parties. 
16. In 1980 Plaintiff sold the two cabin lots on contract to 
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Terra Corp. Terra Corp. filed bankruptcy in 1982. From 1983 to 1991 
Plaintiff expended $4,800 in legal bills and $2,500 as a settlement 
to reacquire the properties. The source of these expenditures was 
his postal income earned during that period. The lots once 
reacquired were placed in Plaintiff's name solely. 
17. During the marriage Plaintiff loaned money to his son. The 
source of the proceeds of the loan was savings accumulated from his 
postal income. Plaintiff's son defaulted on the loan, and to settle 
the debt deeded a 1/3 interest in some Heber City property to 
Plaintiff (the property is described by the parties as 7.7 acres of 
rural ground on Potter Lane in Heber City). The Plaintiff's 1/3 
interest in this property is worth $6,667. The property was not 
vested in the parties' names jointly. The water stock, however, was 
held jointly. 
18. During the marriage Plaintiff traded his equity in the 
fourplex for penny stock which later became worthless. 
19. During the marriage Plaintiff sold his duplex for a contract 
receivable which he then traded together with the equity in his home 
on Wren Road for a down payment on 7 acres of property in Riverton. 
After this trade he was left with a debt owing of $30,000, on which 
he has paid monthly principal and interest payments since 1984. He 
has paid a total of $42,000 in payments and owes a balance of $8,000. 
20. During the marriage Plaintiff accumulated several liquid 
asset accounts as follows: 
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a. Dean Witter money market account of approximately 
$6,000, which Plaintiff accumulated from Plaintiff's postal income. 
b. First Investor IRA Account in the amount of $2,868, 
which was accumulated from Plaintiff's postal income. 
c. IDS account in the amount of $1,754, which was 
accumulated from Plaintiff's postal income. 
21. The parties did not jointly accumulate any personal property 
and have divided their personal assets to their mutual satisfaction. 
22. The Plaintiff has a retirement plan through the Postal 
Service to which he has made contributions throughout the marriage. 
23. The Defendant has expended attorney's fees totaling 
$4,737.11 up to the point of trial plus additional sums for trial 
time and post-trial work. 
24. The Defendant desires to be restored to the name of Tomich 
and the Court finds no legal reason not to do so. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. That the Plaintiff should be granted a divorce from the 
Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. That the following is the marital property of the parties 
and should be divided equally: 
Dean Witter money market account $6,000 
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First Investor IRA Account 2,868 
IDS Account 1, 754 
Montana property 18,000 
3. That the Plaintiff and Defendant have each received and 
should be allowed to keep one-half of the proceeds from the Montana 
property. 
4. The following properties shall be considered pre-marital and 
separate property of the Plaintiff: 
Riverton property 
Dean Whitter utility account 
Cottonwood Canyon Lots 206 and 207 
Potter Lane Property 
5. The following property shall be considered the pre-marital 
and separate property of the Defendant: 
Home located on Kayland Way, Salt Lake City 
6. The Plaintiff's retirement accumulated during the marriage 
shall be considered marital property. 
7. The Defendant shall be awarded one-half of the Plaintiff's 
retirement commencing with the date of the parties' marriage and 
terminating on the date that the Decree of Divorce is signed. A 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue to effectuate the 
same. 
8. The Defendant has need for alimony until she can retire at 
age 65. Plaintiff has the ability to pay alimony and it is just and 
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equitable that the Plaintiff shall be required to pay alimony to the 
Defendant in the amount of $225.00 for a period of four (4) years 
after the divorce is entered. At the end of the four year period, 
the Defendant shall be eligible for retirement and the combination of 
the social security income she will then receive plus her one-half 
interest in the Defendant's retirement should then terminate her need 
for alimony at that point. 
9. That the parties shall each be awarded those items of 
personal property currently in his or her own possession. 
10. The Defendant shall be restored to her previous name of 
Charleen Tomich. 
11. Defendant has need and Plaintiff has the ability to pay and 
it is fair and equitable in view of all the circumstances of this 
case that Defendant be awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $4,500.00 as and for attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
this matter. 
12. The Plaintiff shall pay his own attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in this setter. 
19A Dated this day of 
Frank G. Noel 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVEDCU* >U ^ H ^ \%M 
David Payd. White" 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ITEM 3 
Decree of Divorce 
[JIMW •:/., 
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN (3300) 
Attorney for Defendant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 904904902 DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the above-
entitled Court on the 2nd day of November, 1992, before the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without a 
jury. The Plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorney, David 
Paul White. The Defendant appeared in person and by her attorney, 
Steven C. Tycksen. The Court having then received evidence on behalf 
of each of the parties, and, being fully advised in the premises and 
having rendered its decision herein by way of written Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and it appearing therefrom that judgment 
should be entered for the Plaintiff in accordance therewith and as 
hereinafter set forth, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
HAY 0 h 1993 
DON SCOTT TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CHARLEEN TAYLOR, 
Defendant. 
1. That the Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
le bonds of matrimony between Plaintiff and Defendant. Said Decree 
lall become final upon entry. 
2. The Plaintiff is herewith awarded the Dean Whitter Money 
rket Account, First Investor IRA Account and IDS Account. 
3. The Defendant is herewith awarded judgment against the 
aintiff in the amount of $5,311.00, as one half of the marital 
/estment accounts. 
4. The Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of 
proceeds from the Montana property. This property has already 
>n divided between the parties and no further distribution is 
essary or contemplated by this order and each may keep that which 
y have heretofore received. 
5. The Defendant is herewith awarded one-half of the 
intiff's retirement account with the U.S. Postal Service 
lancing with the date of the parties' marriagp and tejminating on 
datp that the Decree of Divorce is signed and entered by the 
t A Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue to 
ctuate the same. 
6. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the Defendant in 
amount of $225.00 for a period of four (4) years after entry of 
Decree of Divorce. 
7. The parties are each awarded those items of personal 
erty currently in his or her own possession. 
2 
8. The Defendant is herewith restored to her name from her 
ist marriage of Tomich. 
9. Defendant is herewith awarded judgment against the Plaintiff 
the amount of $4,500.00 as and for attorney's fees incurred in 
is matter. 
10. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay his own attorney's fees and 
"Ls incurred in this matter. 
Dated this ( I day of /\ [(j , , , 1993. A(-
r - >- °r ^ >/ 
F r a n k GJ No£l->' J}//-H 
DISTRICT COURT,JUP&te 
{ 
id Pa til White 
o m e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
A N O 7 / t * y 1 o r d e c 3 
